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 1 Introduction
The increase in wage inequality especially in the U.S. is a well-documented
fact (e.g. Katz and Autor, 1999). This increase can be split into increases
within and between groups, deﬁned e.g. by age, education, experience and
other observable characteristics. Almost three quarters of the overall increase
in wage inequality can be attributed to increases within groups.
Most theoretical explanations have been suggested for increases between
groups. Biased technological change and international trade are the most
commonly suggested causes (for reviews, cf. e.g. Acemoglu, 2002 and John-
son and Staﬀord, 1999). The reorganization of production processes (Lind-
beck and Snower 1996; Caroli and van Reenen, 2001) or education systems
(Wälde, 2000) are also sometimes invoked as the primary reason. Some au-
thors have also suggested explanations for the rise in wage inequality within
groups. Most of them try to understand how technological change can be
at the basis of relative wage changes (e.g. Galor and Moav, 2000; Aghion,
2002).
This paper is concerned with rises in wage inequality within groups, given
that this is the quantitatively more important source. It is part of a literature
(cf. e.g. Neary, 2002, or the short overview by Feenstra, 2001) that resusci-
tates international trade as a potential explanation for rising wage inequality,
reacting to the tendency that the trade channel became less popular in recent
years (e.g. Krugman, 2000). Mechanisms based on the Stolper-Samuelson
theorem or on implicit strong labour supply increases are not regarded as
empirically very relevant as relative prices did not change suﬃciently much
and the factor content of trade is not suﬃciently large.
We present a mechanism where neither changes in terms of trade nor
international factor ﬂows are required and nevertheless (the potential of)
international trade causes rising wage inequality. We propose a simple model
where many ﬁrms interact in an imperfectly competitive market and where
an increase in the degree of competition requires ﬁrms to become ”slimmer”.
It is then shown how becoming slimmer and rising wage inequality is related.
In our static setup, the degree of competition among ﬁr m si sc a p t u r e d
by a markup of prices over marginal cost. Assuming Cournot competition
between ﬁrms, the number of competitors active in a market determines the
degree of market power an individual ﬁrm has. Allowing for free entry and
exit, the number of ﬁrms and thereby the markup are endogenous. When the
number of ﬁrms rises, e.g. because the economy’s resource base increases due
to growth or because it opens up for trade, competition rises and markups
of ﬁrms shrink. If a ﬁrms wants to stay in the market despite lower markups
and implied lower operating proﬁts, it needs to reduce overhead costs per
2unit of output. This reorganization at the ﬁrm level induces factor ﬂows at
the aggregate level from administrative activities to production.
A consequence of reallocating factors of production are changes in relative
and absolute wages. Factors of production that are more intensively used in
production gain from reallocation and factors of production less intensively
used lose from reallocation. In the model presented here, no changes in
international goods prices and no increase in the volume of trade is required
to understand wage changes.
The paper also shows that this channel can be of quantitative importance.
Calibrating the model will show that a suﬃciently large reduction in the
market power of ﬁrms can indeed account for up to 100% of the increase in
wage inequality within groups. As a reduction in endogenous market power
is fundamentally caused by changes in the size of an economy as measured
by its factor endowment, accounting for this increase requires an increase of
the economy by a factor of around 9. While such an increase can only partly
b ee x p l a i n e db ye c o n o m i cg r o w t h( G D Pi nt h eU Si n c r e a s e db yaf a c t o ro f
2.8 from 1963 to 1995), it becomes much more plausible when thinking of
integrating the US into a world economy (the active workforce in OECD
countries in 1995 is more than 6 times larger than the workforce of the US in
1963). The paper therefore concludes that integration in the world economy is
the more plausible driving force behind lean production and implied changes
in the wage structure than economic growth. It is also shown how the implied
reductions in market power relate to estimates in the literature on markups
by industry.
The mechanism is of interest also from a purely trade-theoretical per-
spective. Many economists believe (summarized e.g. by Bhagwati, 1994, or
Markusen et al., 1995, ch. 11) that more competition resulting from interna-
tional trade beneﬁts the economy as a whole or even all factors of production.
This is sometimes referred to as the lifting all boats eﬀect. We show that
more competition per se is beneﬁcial for all factors of production indeed but
the reallocation eﬀects caused by more competition can lead to distributional
eﬀects including real losses for certain factors of production.
Clearly, the mechanism whereby international integration leads to more
competition is well—understood from other models with Cournot competition
(Dixit, 1984; Venables, 1985; Eaton and Grossman, 1986; Ruﬃn, 2003).3
Distributional eﬀects have not been studied in these models, however, as
usually only one factor of production is used.
3This result can also be obtained in a Dixit—Stiglitz—type imperfect competition setup.
See e.g. Flam and Helpman’s (1987) analysis of industrial policy in a two—country world.
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2.1 A closed economy
The economy is endowed with a ﬁxed amount of highly-skilled individu-
als H and less-skilled individuals L, also called labour. Production of the
homogeneous consumption good X requires a production process and ad-
ministration services. Production can take place only under administrative
guidance. Administration requires both skilled individuals hm and labour lm
and is provided under constant returns to scale,
m = m(hm,l m), (1)
with m(.) having standard neoclassical properties. Administrative services
can be provided either in—house or bought on the market. In the former case,
each ﬁrm minimizes the costs associated with the provision of m.A s s u m i n g
perfect competition in the administration sector for the latter case, both
interpretations are formally equivalent. In either case, the price pm equals
unit costs,
pm = almwL + ahmwH, (2)
where alm and ahm indicate the amount of less-skilled and skilled workers
used to produce one unit of administrative services and wL and wH are the
respective factor rewards.
The amount of administration services required for production in each
ﬁrm is ﬁxed at ¯ m. Hence, output ˜ x of a representative ﬁrm is given by
˜ x =
 
0 if m<¯ m,
x(hx,l x) if m ≥ ¯ m,
(3)
where x(.) has standard neoclassical properties with constant returns as well
and skilled and less-skilled labour employed for production are denoted by
hx and lx, respectively. Optimal behavior implies m =¯ m.4
Total output is given by the sum of output x of all n ﬁrms in the market,
X = nx.5 As ﬁrms behave as Cournot competitors, the price px of the
consumption good is given by




4T h ee x i s t e n c eo faﬁxed input requirement for administrative services is comparable
to ﬁxed costs. If factor rewards were constant (which they are not), a ﬁxed requirement
for administrative services would be identical to ﬁxed costs of production. Here, the price
for management services pm and, therefore, the associated costs pm ¯ m may respond to
parameter changes. Fixed costs would not.
5We anticipate the fact that all ﬁrms will have the same size as they all face identical
marginal costs.
4where unit input factors for factor i are given by aix and the parameter µ
denotes the markup over the unit costs in squared brackets.
We assume throughout that the skill intensity ρx is higher in the produc-








This assumption will be crucial for our results. When thinking of labour
groups as observationally distinct, various examples can be thought of: in
industries that are low-skill intensive (e.g. mining, construction, some manu-
facturing activities), the administration unit includes management and pro-
duction should be less skill intensive. Consulting ﬁrms or the education
sector, however, can plausibly be considered to have a more skill intensive
production unit. With our focus on observationally equivalent factors of pro-
duction, the assumption in (5) is much more convincing: in the scenario we
analyze, factors of production will move out of administrative activities into
the production units. Workers therefore have to adapt to new job descrip-
tions. Those who move will be the more agile ones and the more highly skilled
will be concentrated in production units. Alternatively, one can stress that a
production process and contact with customers requires more ﬂexibility than
certain repetitive administrative activities.6
With free entry, proﬁts are driven to zero, so that pxx =( alxwL +
ahxwH)x + pm ¯ m. Using the pricing equation (4), the zero proﬁt condition
requires the equality between operating proﬁts (deﬁned as the diﬀerence be-
tween revenues and variable production costs) and administration costs,
pxx
n
= pm ¯ m. (6)
A factor market equilibrium requires the equality of labour supply L and
labour demand in production, alxnx, and for administration, almn¯ m.W i t h
an identical equation for skilled individuals, we obtain
L = alxnx + almn¯ m, (7)
H = ahxnx + ahmn¯ m. (8)
The system of equations (2), (4) and (6) - (8) characterizes the equilibrium
of the economy. We chose administration services as numeraire and normalize
pm to unity. These equations specify the values for the factor prices (wL,w H),
the product price px,t h en u m b e rn of ﬁrms and the output x of an individual
ﬁrm as a function of the exogenously given factor endowments H and L.
6Unfortunately, we did not ﬁnd any data on skill intensities within various departments
of a ﬁrm. Information on e.g. occupation is always for a ﬁrm as a whole. If this information
was available, one could apply this approach also to between group inequality.
52.2 Modelling international integration
We view international integration, economic growth or both as the driving
force behind leaner production and changes in wage inequality. Both interna-
tional integration and growth can be captured in a simple way by an increase
in factor endowments of the economy. When economic growth is labour sav-
ing and the same for both technologies x and m, growth is identical to an
increase in factor endowment. When growth stems from increases in workers’
productivity due to human capital accumulation or learning by doing, this
is again formally identical to an increase in factor endowment. While a fully
dynamic model would be more complete, we believe that our main results
are robust to this extension.
When integration in international goods markets in considered, this can
again be captured by increases in the resource base. Imagine that an economy
opens up to world markets where other countries are characterized by the
same relative endowment H/L, i.e. a situation where integration takes place
e.g. among equally industrialized economies. (Section 7 shows that the main
point holds in more general cases as well.) The fundamental eﬀect integration
has is to embed the formerly autarcic economy in a world economy that has
a larger factor endowment of H and L but the same ratio H/L. Hence,
integration is identical to a equi-proportional increase of H and L.
2.3 Deriving the reduced form
All results concerning lean production, reallocation of factors of production
and changes in the wage structure are therefore derived by analyzing a closed
economy where the factor endowment H and L changes proportionally, while
keeping the ratio
κ ≡ H/L (9)
constant.7 We can use the same approach as Jones (1965), despite the pres-
ence of imperfect competition features in our model. We also study propor-
tional changes of endogenous variables as a function of proportional changes
of exogenous ones. In our case, the following set of equations (derived in ap-
pendix 8.1) determines the proportional changes of x,n,wL,w H,p x as func-
tions of the proportional change in the market size s. Proportional changes
7We need factor price equalisation (FPE) in order to be able to represent integration
in a world economy by an expansion of factor endowments of a closed economy. FPE is
present if either countries are symmetric or countries are not too asymmetric and ﬁrms
can outsource their administrative activities such that they are tradeable. FPE in the
latter case then follows from (2) and (4).
6are denoted by a hat ’ˆ’, i.e. ˆ z = dz/z and exogenous changes in endow-
ments are denoted by ˆ L =ˆ s and ˆ H =ˆ κ +ˆ s,w h e r eˆ κ =0in the main part
of the paper, as discussed above.




−(θlmˆ alm + θhmˆ ahm)=θlm ˆ wL + θhm ˆ wH (11)
ˆ px =ˆ n − ˆ x (12)
ˆ s − (λlxˆ alx + λlmˆ alm)=λlxˆ x +ˆ n (13)
ˆ κ +ˆ s − (λhxˆ ahx + λhmˆ ahm)=λhxˆ x +ˆ n (14)
The coeﬃcient λij stands for the fraction of the factor i used in the produc-
tion of good j (cf. appendix, equation (28)). As factors are fully employed,
fractions add to unity, i.e. λix +λim =1 , i = l,h.T h ec o e ﬃcient θij denotes
the share of value added (adjusted for markups)8 going to factor i in activity
j (cf. appendix, equation (32)). Accordingly, the shares of both factors add
to unity, i.e. θlj + θhj =1 , j = x,m.
Equations (10) and (11) describe how prices and wages respond to pa-
rameter changes. For the oligopolistic production of the consumption good
(10), changes in factor rewards are accommodated by changes in the price px,
in technologies (the term in brackets on the left-hand side) and by changes in
t h em a r k u p .T h ed e ﬁnition of the markup in (4) implies that its proportional
change is given by ˆ µ = −ˆ n/(n − 1). For administrative activities, equation
(11) illustrates that changes in the factor prices are balanced by adjustments
in technologies only. The price pm for administration services cannot adjust,
a si tw a sc h o s e na sn u m e r a i r e .
Equation (12) stems from the zero proﬁt condition (6). As the price for
administration services was set to unity and a ﬁx e da m o u n to fa d m i n i s t r a -
tion services is required, it simply says that zero proﬁts prevail only if the
operating proﬁts from sales of the consumption good remain constant (in
nominal terms).9
Equations (13) and (14) describe equilibrium changes on the factor mar-
ket. An equi-proportional increase ˆ s in the market size is accommodated by
changes in the technology (the term in the brackets on the left-hand side)
and changes in the supply (the right-hand side). As the demand of a single
ﬁrm for administration services is ﬁxed, supply can only vary when either
output x of the representative ﬁrm or the number n of ﬁrms change. Since
the factor shares of both activities add to one, ˆ n is not weighted.
8This adjustment allows us to use this very convenient approach despite imperfect
competition in our setup which contrasts the perfect competition analysis of Jones (1965).
9We will see below that proﬁts will need to change in terms of the consumption good.
7Equations (10)—(14) can be simpliﬁed. As both oligopolistic consumption
good ﬁrms and perfectly competitive administration ﬁrms minimize produc-
tion costs and are price takers on the factor markets, we obtain
θljˆ alj + θhjˆ ahj =0 ,j = x,m (15)
for both types of activities (cf. appendix 8.1.2). Firms produce at minimum
costs when the cost of an additional unit of labour is exactly oﬀset by mar-
ginally reducing the amount of skilled individuals. This condition simpliﬁes
the pricing equations (10) and (11) as the brackets on the left-hand side
disappear.
The zero proﬁt condition (12) can be used in equation (10). Subtracting
equation (11) from the resulting condition yields
ˆ x − µˆ n + |θ|(ˆ wL − ˆ wH)=0 , (16)
where |θ| is the determinant of the factor share matrix θ (cf. appendix, equa-
tion (35)). Equation (34) in the appendix shows that the determinant |θ|
is negative if the technology for producing the consumption good is skill in-
tensive relative to the technology for administration services (as we assume).
This equation is the ﬁrst one to be used in the reduced form.
With linear homogenous production functions and perfect competition on
factor markets, the elasticity of substitution between the factors of produc-
tion in activity j c a nb ew r i t t e na sσj =( ˆ ahj − ˆ alj)/(ˆ wL − ˆ wH).T o g e t h e r
with the appropriate equation from (15), we obtain (cf. appendix 8.1.3)
λlxˆ alx + λlmˆ alm = δl(ˆ wL − ˆ wH), (17)
λhxˆ ahx + λhmˆ ahm = −δh(ˆ wL − ˆ wH), (18)
where
δl ≡ λlxθhxσx + λlmθhmσm,δ h ≡ λhxθlxσx + λhmθlmσm. (19)
These equations can be used to replace changes in technology in factor market
conditions (13) and (14) by changes in relative factor rewards. This yields
λlxˆ x +ˆ n − δl(ˆ wL − ˆ wH)=ˆ s (20)
λhxˆ x +ˆ n + δh(ˆ wL − ˆ wH)=ˆ s +ˆ κ (21)
Together with equation (16), the modiﬁed factor market equilibrium condi-
tions (20) and (21) constitute a system of equations which determines the
eﬀect of changes in the exogenous variable s, i.e. the eﬀe c to fa ni n c r e a s e
8in the resource base, on the endogenous variables (n,x,wL/wH). For later
purposes, we summarize these equations as























3 Aggregate eﬀects of an increasing resource
base
The ﬁrst question to be answered is whether the number of ﬁrms grows
proportionally or under—proportionally when countries grow or integrate, i.e.
when s increases. In the former case, no exit of ﬁrms would take place:
With an integration scenario in mind, the number of ﬁrms in the integration
equilibrium is just the sum of the number of ﬁrms in the countries’ autarky
state. In the latter case the world—wide number of ﬁrms in a trading situation
is lower than the sum of the number of ﬁrms in autarky – international
integration implies exit of ﬁrms.
Proposition 1 The number of ﬁrms rises under—proportionally if the mar-
ket size s increases, i.e.
ˆ s>0 ⇒ 0 < ˆ n<ˆ s.
Proof. Deﬁne j1 ≡ |θ||λ|, j2 ≡ δl + δh and j3 ≡ µ[δlλhx + δhλlx] .T h i s
deﬁnition directly implies j2,j 3 > 0. From (30) and (34) j1 > 0 as well.
Using (31), the determinant of the Jacobi matrix in (22) can be written as
|J| = j1 + j2 + j3 > 0 (23)
and the second element of adj Jd is ˆ s(j1 + j2) ≡ Jnˆ s.H e n c e ,ˆ n =ˆ s(j1 +
j2)/|J|.A sj1 + j2 < |J|, it follows that 0 < ˆ n<ˆ s if ˆ s>0.
This proposition can be illustrated for a trade scenario as follows: imme-




c ﬁrms in the market, where na
c is the number of ﬁrms in autarky in
country c. Proposition 1 indicates that this situation is not sustainable in the
long run. The adjustment process is therefore characterized by an reduction
of the number of ﬁrms. The reason for ﬁrm exit is that immediately after
o p e n i n gu pt ot r a d e ,ﬁrms make losses: The markup µ in (4) reduces due to
the increased number of competitors while cost of administrative services at
pre-integration output can not be covered. Firms therefore leave the market
until the zero proﬁt condition holds again.
9Proposition 2 The output x of a ﬁrm increases with the market size s, i.e.
ˆ s>0 ⇒ ˆ x>0.
Proof. From (22), ˆ x =ˆ sµj2/|J|.A s |J| > 0 from (23), it follows that
ˆ x>0 if ˆ s>0.
The zero proﬁt condition is restored at a lower markup by an expansion
of output per ﬁrm. With constant ﬁxed costs resulting from the required
ﬁxed input ¯ m of administrative services, ﬁrms need to produce more in order
earn the same amount of the operating proﬁts that allow to cover these ﬁxed
costs, i.e. ˆ x>0
The previous two propositions can be combined to obtain
Proposition 3 The output of the consumption good increases over—propor-
tionally as the market size rises, i.e.
ˆ s>0 ⇒ ˆ n +ˆ x>ˆ s.
Proof. Let j1, j2, j3, |J|, Jx and Jn be deﬁned as above. Then, ˆ n +ˆ x =
ˆ s(Jn+Jx)/|J|.A sλhx,λ lx < 1, µj2 >j 3 so that Jn+Jx > |J| and ˆ n+ˆ x>ˆ s.
This eﬀect can also be explained with increasing competition in the pro-
duction of x. As in the integration scenario the world—wide number of
oligopolistic ﬁrms reduces due to integration, there are fewer administrative
jobs after integration. Factors of production therefore move from adminis-
trative to productive activities and total output increases. As competition
r i s e si ne a c hc o u n t r y ,t h i se ﬀect holds also for each country individually (each
country produces more than before integration) and the increase in consump-
tion good output ˆ n+ˆ x must be larger than the increase ˆ s in the market size.
For the international integration scenario, this proposition implies
Corollary 1 There are gains from trade.
Proof. For monotonous utility functions, social welfare u is an increasing
function of output X of the consumption good normalized by country size
s, u = u(X/s), u (·) > 0.A s ˆ n +ˆ x − ˆ s>0 by the last proposition, X/s
increases as country size increases. Welfare u therefore rises when countries
integrate.
104 Distributional eﬀects of an expanding re-
source base
4.1 General results
We now study the eﬀects of a rising resource base for relative factor rewards.
Proposition 4 At invariant relative factor endowment, human capital re-
wards wH rise relative to wages wL following an increase in the market size
s, whenever the production of the consumption good is more skill intensive
than production of administration services, i.e.











Proof. Let the determinant of the Jacobi matrix be deﬁned as above.
The third element of adj Jd is ˆ sµ|λ| so that ˆ wH − ˆ wL = −ˆ sµ|λ|/|J|.T h e n ,
the proposition follows directly from equation (30).
The intuition behind this proposition is similar to the intuition behind
the Stolper—Samuelson theorem. Continue to assume that production is skill
intensive relative to administration. When relative output of administrative
services declines due to an increase of the economy, the proportion of less-
skilled relative to skilled labour that becomes available is, at given relative
factor prices, higher than the proportion that production is willing to absorb.
Full employment can therefore only be restored if ﬁrms (in all sectors) or
departments (for both activities) substitute less-skilled by skilled individuals.
The latter takes place only if factor rewards for labour decrease relatively to
factor rewards for the skilled.
While these relative changes are important, absolute changes allow a bet-
ter prediction of changes in individual welfare. For real factor rewards we
have
Proposition 5 The factor of production that gains relative to the other fac-
tor also gains in real terms,










− ˆ px > 0.
Proof. The proof holds for the case where skilled workers gain relatively
to labour, ˆ wH − ˆ wL > 0. Subtracting equation (10) from ˆ wH and noting that
the bracket term on the left-hand side vanishes gives ˆ wH − ˆ px = θlx(ˆ wH −
11ˆ wL)+ˆ n/(n − 1). Both terms on the right-hand side are positive. The proof
for the opposite case where ˆ wH − ˆ wL < 0 follows equivalent steps.
Surprisingly, a relative decline of wages does not necessarily (as in the
Stolper-Samuelson theorem for the perfect competition model) imply a decline
of wages in terms of the consumption good:
Proposition 6 The factor of production that loses relative to the other fac-
tor gains in real terms if the price reduction eﬀect from more competition is
stronger than the wage reduction eﬀect coming from reallocation,














Proof. Solving equation (10) for ˆ wL − ˆ px, taking (15) and (33) into
account, gives




Equation (24) nicely reveals the intuition behind propositions 5 and 6:
Changes in real factor rewards depend on changes in relative factor rewards
caused by factor reallocation, as captured by the ﬁrst term on the right-hand
side, and on changes in the number of ﬁrms in the economy, the second
term on the right-hand side of the equation. An increase of this second
term represents an increase in competition and thereby a reduction in the
distortion on the ﬁnal good market. As economic growth or international
integration increases the number of competitors, this second term stands for
the reduction of the markup which implies, ceteris paribus, lower proﬁts and
therefore a larger share of output going to factors of production implying
higher real factor rewards.
Real rewards for skilled workers therefore increase as both the relative
change in factor rewards (i.e. the reallocation from administration to pro-
duction) and the increase in competition imply higher rewards for skill. Real
wages for unskilled workers decrease as in the perfect competition model if
the beneﬁcial eﬀect from more competition is weak. Real wages increase
if the competition eﬀect outweighs the loss implied by the reallocation to
production activities.
This discussion directly implies the following
Corollary 2 (a) If a country characterized by a strong domestic ineﬃciency
(few domestic ﬁrms and high markups) integrates, there are gains from inte-
gration and both factors of production gain in real terms.
( b )I fac o u n t r yw i t hl o wm a r k u p ss t a r t st r a d i n g ,s k i l l e dw o r k e r sp r o ﬁt
and less-skilled workers lose in real terms.
12Proposition 6 is important also because it formalizes and partially con-
tradicts an argument dear to many trade economists. Rising competition
b yo p e n i n gu pt ot r a d ei sb e n e ﬁcial for all factors of production as it re-
duces domestic ineﬃciencies. This is referred to as ”lifting all boats” by e.g.
Bhagwati (1994). Our setup shows that this is not necessarily the case. In
fact, rising international competition is the source of more wage inequality
by proposition 5 and can even lead by proposition 6 to a drop in real wages
of the less favoured factor of production.
4.2 Cobb—Douglas and CES economies
Equation (24) provides intuition for potential negative distributional eﬀects
of international competition. This expression by itself, however, does not
provide information on whether the positive eﬀect of stronger competition
(the second term) might not actually always overcompensate the negative
eﬀect for low-skilled resulting from reallocation (the ﬁrst term). This section
therefore studies a Cobb—Douglas and a CES economy for which more precise
results are available.
In a Cobb—Douglas version of the economy presented above, technologies
in (1) and (3) are given by m(hm,l m)=hβ
ml1−β
m and x(hx,l x)=hα
xl1−α
x , where
α>β .Going through similar steps as for deriving proposition 6 gives
Theorem 7 In a Cobb—Douglas economy, both factors gain in real terms.
Proof. cf. appendix 8.2
In the Cobb-Douglas case, more international competition ”lifts all boats”
indeed: International integration always reduces the ineﬃciency of imperfect
competition suﬃciently much. In this Cobb-Douglas case, part (a) of corol-
lary 2 holds and factors of production in each country gain from integration.




















We assume identical elasticities of substitutions across activities as this guar-
antees a more skill intensive production activity, as long as α>β .Unfor-
tunately, no analytical results more speciﬁc than (24) can be obtained. A
numerical solution, however, shows that for a large parameter set real wages
for low-skilled increase while for other parameters, real wages drop.10 Hence,
10All numerical solutions were computed in Mathematica. The programmes are available
upon request. For a typical choice of parameters that leads to an increase of all real wages,
cf. table 1 below. When the H/L ratio is higher, real wages of labour drop.
13Numerical result 1 In a CES economy, international competition can lead
to ”lifting all boats” or to the traditional Stolper-Samuelson eﬀect, even
though terms of trade are constant and (implied) factor ﬂows are zero.
Whatever the choice of parameters, intuition for the result always goes
back to equation (24). Any parameter change that implies more competition
in autarky and a lower growth of numbers of competitors when the econ-
omy opens up leads to less strong gains from integration due to a reduced
distortion. As a consequence, the factor experiencing a loss in demand due
to relocation of economic activity from administration to production and
lower wages tends to lose from more international competition. Part (b) of
corollary 2 would therefore be the relevant ﬁnding.
5 Wage inequality and trade
Even though the discussion so far often referred to international trade, the
fundamental driving force has been an increase in factor endowment. This
increase can result both from economic growth and international integration.
This section will therefore use a numerical solution of the CES speciﬁcation
( 2 5 )i no r d e rt oc o m p u t eb yh o wm u c ht h er e s o u r c eb a s en e e d st oi n c r e a s e
in order to explain a suﬃciently large increase in wage inequality. By doing
so, international integration turns out to be the more plausible source for
a rise in wage inequality through the channel presented here than economic
growth.
5.1 Calibration
The variance of log weekly wages of full-time, full-year (male and female)
workers increased in the United States from .25 in 1963 to .36 in 1995 i.e. by
.11 (Katz and Autor, 1999, Tables 1 and 5). One-quarter of this change can
be attributed to changes between groups, three-quarters are changes within
groups, i.e. due to unobserved factors diﬀerent from education, experience
etc. When wage inequality is measured by the 90/10 log weekly wage dif-
ferential, inequality increased for male workers from roughly 1.2 to roughly
1.55 within the same period (Katz and Autor, 1999, Figure 4), i.e. wage
income of the 90th percentile worker was 3.3 times wage income of the 10th
percentile worker in 1963 and 4.7 times in 1995.
Can the mechanism presented above account for this increase? Looking
at the structure of the CES version of the model shows that the model can be
calibrated to reﬂect the situation in 1963 with 100% precision. Equilibrium
14can be described by a free-entry condition and two labor market clearing
























where aij are the CES versions of unit demand functions. These three equa-
tions determine the endogenous variables x
¯ m,nand ω ≡ wL/wH. If we want a
certain relative wage to be the equilibrium wage, we ﬁx all parameter values
and modify H/L to obtain the desired relative wage. By modifying also L,
a reasonable degree of competition, i.e. at reasonable mark-up, can be ob-
tained. The number n of ﬁrms should thereby not be seen as the number of
independent ﬁrms in some actual economy but rather as the certain degree
of competition. A more realistic modelling would imply many sectors and
certain demand elasticities (which equal unity here). The following table
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.1 3.1 .2
Table 1: Parameter choices
We ﬁrst set the elasticity of substitution at some suﬃciently high value,
say ε =5 , to capture inequality within groups where factors are good sub-
stitutes and perform very similar jobs. Parameters for technologies in (25)
are chosen symmetric around .5 such that a shift towards production implies
higher demand for skilled, i.e. α>β . In order to obtain the 1963 90/10
wage ratio, ω is set equal to 1/3.3, corresponding to the stylized facts re-
ported above.11 We further impose µ =3which means that 2/3 of revenue
is used to pay ﬁxed costs and 1/3 is used to cover variable cost.
The implied values for H/¯ m and L/¯ m, i.e. factor endowments which
would give the imposed values of ω and µ as equilibrium outcomes are .1 and
3.1. In eﬃciency units there are 30 times more less-skilled than skilled.12
11Setting ω =1 /3.3 implicitly assumes that relative productivity h of skilled to less-
skilled is one. If some reasonable ratio NH/NL of the number of skilled to unskilled workers
should be reﬂected as well, one can choose relative productivity h diﬀerent from one to
determine H/L ≡ NHh/NL. The relative observed wage would then be wL/(hwH).
12Again, this is a consequence of the assumption that h =1and would be smaller with
h>1.
15Output of a representative ﬁrm amounts to x/¯ m = .2. A l lt h i si sr e l a t i v et o
ﬁxed management requirements (which could be chosen to match some other
variable of interest).
5.2 Trade or growth?
We then increase H and L equi-proportionally, representing an integration
into a world economy with the same high-skill to skill ratio. Focusing on
relative wages, we get the following picture.







Figure 1: Relative wages under increasing international competition
The relative wage ratio in 1963, where the relative market size of the US
is 1 (meaning that the country is in autarky), is 3.3. Over time, the relative
market size, i.e. the market in which US ﬁrms are active, increases. Measur-
ing the exact increase in the market size is very diﬃcult and depends on the
industry, growth in this industry and its openness. In terms of the model,
the size is measured by the increase in factor endowments H and L from
a country in autarky to factor endowments of all economies taken together
in an integrated world economy. If we measure this endowment in 1963 by
the active workforce of the US (approx. 67 million, full time equivalent) and
endowment of the integrated world economy in 1995 by the active workforce
of OECD countries (approx. 418 million), endowment increased from 67 to
418 by a factor of 6.2. Real US GDP over this period increased by a factor
16of approx. 2.8. The total increase of the resource-base, i.e. the size of the
market in the sense of the above model, therefore amounts to 9.
Looking at ﬁgure 1 shows that the relative wage predicted by the model
increases from 3.3 at a resource base of 1 to 4.1 after a 9-fold increase. The
observed increase is from 3.3 to 4.7. Taking into account that only three
quarters are intended to be explained by the present model (as we focus on
within group wage inequality), the observed increase that should be explained
is from 3.3 to 4.35. As this is 75% of the observed increase, the model is able
to capture roughly the entire increase in within group wage inequality.
Recalling that the overall increase in the resource base by a factor of 9
splits into an increase due to international trade of 6.2 and only 2.8 due
to growth, one can argue that, given this theoretical background, the over-
whelming share of the increase in wage inequality within groups is accounted
for by international trade.13
5.3 Empirical evidence on markups
Our mechanism to explain rising wage inequality depends centrally on the
increase in competition. This increase is predicted to decrease the markup.
In the calibration presented above, the markup shrinks from µ =3in 1963
to µ =1 .36 in 1995.
There is a considerable literature that provides estimates of the markup
of prices over marginal cost. The literature started with Hall (1988, 1990)
and was followed by Roeger (1995), Basu and Fernald (1995) and others.14
An overview of ﬁndings is given in table 2.
Hall 1988 Roeger 1995
Basu and
Fernald 1995
returns 1( i m p o s e d ) 1( i m p o s e d ) <1
markup µ 2.06; 3.10 1.45; 1.48 1.15
Table 2: Markup estimates
Hall (1988) derived the speciﬁcation for his regression equation under the
assumption of constant returns to scale. Markup estimates were obtained
for up to 26 industries and for industry groups. Estimates for durable goods
13Clearly, this does not rule out the relevance of explanations based on biased tech-
nological change or other mechanisms. An ultimative judgement would require a model
that encompasses all these mechanisms. The main point here is to stress the importance
international integration can have.
14A more recent analysis with further references is by Altug and Filiztekin (2002).
17and non-durable goods are 2.06 and 3.10, respectively. This is broadly in the
range of the initial markup of µ =3we set above. Subsequently, estimates
of markups became smaller as the upward bias in Hall’s approach could be
removed by also taking relationships for prices into account: Roeger (1995)
ﬁnds values of 1.45 and 1.48 only. Basu and Fernald (1995) allow for non-
constant returns to scale and use output rather than value added data. They
ﬁnd decreasing returns to scale (cf. also Basu and Fernald, 1997) and a
markup of 1.15, i.e. even lower than Roeger’s results.
Given that none of these studies provides evidence on a possible time
trend for markups, one could conclude that markups are basically constant
(even though a cyclical movement of markups is well-documented; e.g. Altug
and Filiztekin, 2002). This would mean that any explanation that builds on
shrinking markups is not convincing.
One should take into consideration, however, that an empirical analysis
that takes the above model as its starting point would end up with a diﬀerent
regression speciﬁcation than those used so far. Estimates of markups in the
literature usually start from a representation of an aggregate technology like






ˆ L − ˆ K
 
, (26)
where again ˆ z ≡ dz/z, α and β are the output elasticities of capital K and
labour L, respectively, A is total factor productivity and (1 − η−1)
−1 is the
markup (e.g. eq. (5.26) in Hall, 1990, or eq. (2) in Basu and Fernald, 1997).
T h ed e g r e eo fi n c r e a s i n gr e t u r n si sg i v e nb yα + β.
In order to get a corresponding equation for our case, one would have to
imagine an extension of the above model to allow for capital and (given that
there are no observations on L and H) merge all workers in one group L.
The starting point for regressions would then be






ˆ Lx − ˆ Kx
 
. (27)
The crucial diﬀerence to (26) consists in the expression wLLx/(px). Instead
of the share of total labour in output, wLL/(pY ), this equation contains
only the share of labour used in production (i.e. only labour causing variable
cost, and not labour being employed in administrative activities and causing
ﬁxed cost). If the prediction of the above model on shrinking markups is to
be tested, this should therefore be taken into consideration. If ﬁrms become
slimmer in the real world and wLLx/(px) in (27) increases, the markup
(1 − η−1)
−1 would have to decrease.
Summarizing, future work on markups should take ﬁxed cost and the
possibility of variable importance of ﬁxed cost relative to total cost or output
18into account. When this is done, insight about the empirical relevance of the
above theoretical model can be gained.
6C o n c l u s i o n
We have analyzed a model with Cournot competition and free entry and exit
where production requires a ﬁxed amount of administration services. The
number of ﬁrms active in such an economy and the markup of ﬁrms de-
creases when competition rises. When international integration takes place,
competition increases and some domestic and foreign ﬁrms exit the market.
The number of ﬁrms producing in an integrated world economy is therefore
lower than the sum of the number of ﬁrms producing in autarcic economies.
Nevertheless, it is higher than the number of ﬁrms in each country in autarky.
This is the competition increasing eﬀect of integration.
More international competition leading to shrinking markups implies an
expansion of plant size for surviving ﬁrms. Assuming that the production
technology is more skill intensive than the administration technology, these
factor movements lead to a decrease in skill intensity in all sectors and there-
fore an increase of factor rewards for skills. When integration takes place
between countries of identical factor endowment, integration does not aﬀect
relative prices by trade ﬂows. Nevertheless, relative factor rewards change.
Measuring factor rewards in real terms, integration implies an increase
in real rewards for skilled individuals, real wages for less-skilled may fall or
rise, depending on the degree of domestic distortions before opening up to
trade. If domestic distortions were weak (e.g. in a large country with small
markups), more competition implies a real decrease in wages. If domestic
distortions were strong (in a country with high markups), integration leads
to a considerable increase in the number of ﬁrms and therefore to a strong
reduction of the distortion. This positive eﬀect can outweigh the negative
eﬀect of losses of wages relative to skills caused by factor relocation from
administration to production. Summarizing, more international competition
has a lifting-all-boats eﬀect if the increase in competition is suﬃciently large.
If not, more international competition implies that certain factors of produc-
tion loose in real terms.
When calibrating the model, it turned out that the increase in within-
group wage inequality in the US from 1963 to 1995 can be attributed both to
economic growth and integration in the world economy. Given our theoreti-
cal analysis, however, integration in the world economy plays a substantially




We deﬁne a matrix λ that shows the fraction of factors used in the production












Rows in this matrix add to unity,
λix + λim =1 ,i = l,h. (29)












Using (29), the determinant of λ c a nb ew r i t t e na s
|λ| = λlx − λhx. (31)
The matrix θ denoting the share of the return attributed to the factors












Again, the rows of the matrix θ add to one, i.e.
θlj + θhj =1 ,j = x,m. (33)
The determinant of θ is negative if the same condition as in (30) is met,
|θ| ≶ 0 ⇔ ρx ≷ ρm. (34)
Using (33), the determinant of θ reads
|θ| = θlx − θlm. (35)
15An additional appendix with further derivations is available upon request.
207.2 Diﬀering skill richness
This appendix looks at distributional eﬀects of integrating with an economy
that has a diﬀerent skilled to less-skilled labour ratio than the economy under
consideration. In terms of our reduced form (22), this means that we now
allow for changes in κ as well. In what follows, we assume factor price
equalization. Diﬀerences in skill endowment of trading economies should
therefore be not too large.
The traditional eﬀect is summarized in the following generalization of
proposition 4 which directly follows from (22):
Proposition 8 Human capital rewards wH rise relative to wages wL ceteris
paribus whenever skill richness κ falls,
ˆ wH − ˆ wL = −
1
|J|
[µ|λ| ˆ s +( 1+µλlx)ˆ κ]. (36)
Understanding this equation is straightforward: integration implies rela-
tive gains of skills due to the eﬀect studied before. Integration with a skill-
poor country, i.e. ˆ κ<0, makes skills more scarce and skilled individuals
gain further. Relative skill gains can be (over-) compensated if the country
integrates with a skill-rich country, i.e. for ˆ κ>0.
More important for policy discussions are the eﬀects on real factor re-
wards. We can repeat the results of proposition 5:
Proposition 9 The factor of production that gains relative to the other fac-
tor, also gains in real terms,








Proof. These expressions were derived in (24) and the proof of proposi-
tion 5.
The lifting all boats eﬀect ˆ n/(n − 1) is present in both equations: Whether
a country starts trading with another country that has more or less skilled
individuals relative to its labour endowment, an integrated world economy
always has more resources than a country in autarky. As a consequence,
the number of ﬁrms under integration is larger, ˆ n/(n − 1) > 0, and com-
petition therefore ﬁercer. Both factors of production gain from this eﬀect.
Clearly, the factor that gains in relative terms also gains in real terms, as
both expressions in (37) or (38) would then be positive.
21The potential loss in real wages of a factor of production induced by
changes in relative endowment κ therefore works entirely through the relative-
wage channel (36) and not through the pro-competitive eﬀect. This also
makes clear why proposition 6 remains unchanged, despite changes in κ.
One could now analyze the extreme case where an increase in L, keeping
H constant, i.e. taking up trade with a country that is very labour rich,
leads to increases in real wages of unskilled workers. It can be shown and it
is intuitively clear that the number of ﬁrms increases as long as the resource
base of an integrated world economy rises. Hence, workers beneﬁtf r o m
more competition among ﬁrms. This eﬀect is not strong enough, however, to
balance the decrease in wages due to more labor supply. Summarizing, the
endowment eﬀect of more labour supply is always stronger than the induced
competition eﬀect and real factor rewards for labour fall.
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